Antitrust Lawyer Blog Commentary on Current Developments

Articles Posted in Merger Highlights

On February 28, 2017, U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan ruled that Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia AGs were not entitled to $175,000 in legal fees for their efforts in the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) challenge to Staples Inc.’s proposed acquisition of Office Depot.

The FTC clearly took the lead and won a preliminary injunction under the more lenient standard under 13(b) of the FTC Act.  After winning the preliminary injunction not a permanent injunction under the Clayton Act, Staples and Office Depot abandoned their merger plans.

Pennsylvania and D.C. argued they were entitled to fees under a provision of the Clayton Act that allows for the reimbursement of legal costs when the plaintiff “substantially prevails.” Staples’ lawyers painted the AGs as mere spectators and argued that they should not be entitled to legal fees for two reasons.  First, they did not win under the Clayton Act and second, the fees were unreasonable.

Anthem Cigna Merger Blocked

February 8, 2017

On February 8, 2017, Judge Jackson blocked Anthem Inc.’s (“Anthem”) acquisition of Cigna Corp. (“Cigna”) finding that the merger would likely harm competition.  The district court wholly refuted the parties’ argument that efficiencies would be pro-consumer and a counter-weight to potential competitive problems.  U.S. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson also recognized the highly abnormal relationship between Anthem and Cigna, saying the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) was not the only party in the case raising questions about the merger.

On February 16, 2017, the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) announced that energy infrastructure companies Enbridge Inc. (“Enbridge”) and Spectra Energy Corp (“Spectra”) agreed to settle FTC charges that the proposed $28 billion merger of Enbridge and Spectra likely would harm competition in the market for pipeline transportation of natural gas in three production areas off the coast of Louisiana.

According to the FTC’s complaint, the merger likely would reduce natural gas pipeline competition in three offshore natural gas producing areas in the Gulf of Mexico – Green Canyon, Walker Ridge and Keathley Canyon – leading to higher prices for natural gas pipeline transportation from those areas.  In portions of the affected areas, the FTC alleged, the merging parties’ pipelines are the two pipelines located closest to certain wells and, as a result, are likely the lowest cost pipeline transportation options for those wells.

Under the settlement with the FTC, the companies have agreed to behavioral conditions that will preserve competition in those areas.  Enbridge is the sole owner and operator of the Walker Ridge Pipeline.  Through its indirect stake in DCP Midstream Partners, LP (“DCP”), Houston-based Spectra indirectly owns a 40% interest in the Discovery Pipeline.  According to the FTC, the proposed merger will give Enbridge an ownership interest in both pipelines, which will give it access to competitively sensitive information of the Discovery Pipeline, as well as significant voting rights over the Discovery Pipeline.  Access to its competitor’s competitively sensitive information and significant voting rights would provide Enbridge with the incentive and opportunity to unilaterally increase pipeline transportation costs for natural gas producers located in the affected areas.  The exchange of information also may increase the likelihood of tacit or explicit anticompetitive coordination between the Walker Ridge Pipeline and the Discovery Pipeline.

On February 3, 2017, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) released a study entitled “The FTC’s Merger Remedies 2006-2012” (“Remedy Study”). The Remedy Study, a report of the FTC’s Bureaus of Competition and Economics, examines 89 merger orders affecting 400 markets, with 79 divestitures to 121 buyers, and evaluates 50 of those orders using a case study method.  To conduct the Remedy Study, the FTC interviewed nearly 200 businesses in a wide range of industries.

The Remedy Study confirms that the FTC’s practices related to designing, drafting and implementing its merger remedies are generally effective.  At the same time, the Remedy Study identifies a number of shortcomings that the FTC needs to address to improve the remedy process.

Some of the key findings and adjustments include:

On January 18, 2017, the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division (“Antitrust Division”) announced a $600,000 civil settlement against Duke Energy for illegal “gun-jumping” violations of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR Act”).

The HSR Act requires that parties to certain acquisitions notify the antitrust enforcement agencies and observe a waiting period before consummating the transaction or transferring beneficial ownership of a business.  Duke Energy prematurely obtained beneficial ownership over a power plant through a tolling agreement before filing its HSR pre-notification form and observing the HSR waiting period.

Background

About a week before taking office, President-elect Trump had two high level meetings with CEOs of companies that are involved in significant acquisitions currently under antitrust review by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.  The meetings raise questions about the integrity and independence of the DOJ’s merger reviews going forward under a Trump administration. 


AT&T/Time Warner

On January 12, 2017, AT&T Inc. (“AT&T”) Chief Executive Officer Randall Stephenson said that in his meeting with President-elect Donald Trump they touched on job creation, investment and competition, but he noted that AT&T’s merger with Time Warner Inc. (“Time Warner”) did not come up.  We find that hard to believe given President-elect Trump’s open reservations about the transaction and his ongoing battle with CNN.

On October 26, 2016, the DOJ announced that it will require Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation (“Wabtec”) to divest Faiveley Transport North America’s (“Faiveley”) entire U.S. freight car brakes business in order for Wabtec to proceed with its proposed approximately $1.8 billion acquisition of Faiveley Transport S.A. and Faiveley Transport North America.

The acquisition as originally proposed would have eliminated Faiveley as one of only three major companies that supplies freight car brake components in the United States and eliminated Faiveley as a pipeline competitor in the development, manufacture and sale of freight car control valves – essentially freezing a century-old duopoly in that market.

The proposed settlement includes a divestiture of Faiveley’s entire U.S. freight car brakes business which develops, manufactures and sells freight car brake systems and components including: air brake control valves, hand brakes, slack adjusters, truck-mounted brake assemblies, empty load devices and brake cylinders.  The divestiture also includes Faiveley’s FTEN control valve, a freight car brake control valve under development that will be available for full commercialization after approval from the Association of American Railroads. The DOJ required the sale to be made to a single buyer to be approved by the Antitrust Division.

On July 27, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) cleared to generic pharmaceutical deals.

Mylan/Meda Deal

Mylan, N.V. agreed to divest the rights and assets related to two generic products to settle allegations that its proposed $7.2 billion acquisition of Meda AB would be anticompetitive.  Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Alvogen Pharma US, Inc. will acquire the rights and assets related to 400 mg and 600 mg felbamate tablets (used to treat refractory epilepsy) from Mylan, and Mylan must also relinquish its U.S. marketing rights for 250 mg carisoprodol tablets (used to treat muscle spasms and stiffness) to allow Indicus Pharma LLC to compete in the U.S. market.  See FTC Press Release.

On July 21, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and several state attorneys general filed two lawsuits, challenging two major health insurer mergers: (1) Anthem, Inc.’s (“Anthem”) proposed $48.4 billion purchase of Cigna Corporation (“Cigna”) and (2) Aetna Inc.’s (“Aetna”) planned $37 billion acquisition of Humana Inc. (“Humana”).

While the cases are substantially different, both complaints contain some similar allegations.  Both complaints describe the proposed mergers as consolidation of the “big five” insurers to the “big three, each of which would have almost twice the revenue of the next largest insurer.”   Taken together, they would cut the number of major health insurers from five to three, with UnitedHealth Group Incorporated (“UnitedHealth”) being the only other remaining large player.  Both complaints say the mergers will harm competition by “eliminating two innovative competitors – Humana and Cigna – at a time when the industry is experimenting with new ways to lower healthcare costs.”  Both complaints allege that the mergers will restrain competition in the sale of individual policies on the public insurance exchanges.

However, the cases are different in that they focus on different product and geographic markets and that the Anthem/Cigna complaint contains a monopsony claim while the Aetna/Humana complaint does not.  The Anthem/Cigna complaint alleges that that merger will restrain competition in the “purchase of healthcare services by commercial health insurers,” as well as the sale of commercial health insurance to national accounts and large-group employers, and the sale of individual policies on the public insurance exchanges.  The Anthem/Cigna complaint also includes an allegation that the merger would substantially increase Anthem’s ability to dictate the reimbursement rates it pays hospitals, doctors, and healthcare providers, threatening the availability and quality of medical care.  The DOJ alleges that Anthem already has bargaining leverage over healthcare providers and this acquisition would make the situation worse in 35 metropolitan areas.  This is otherwise known as a monopsony theory.   The Aetna/Humana complaint alleges anticompetitive effects only in the sale of Medicare Advantage policies to individual seniors and the sale of individual polices on the public exchanges.   The Aetna complaint does not charge a violation in the market for the purchase of healthcare services, and therefore does not rely on a monopsony theory.  Even where the complaints overlap with respect to product market as is the case with the sale of individual policies on the public insurance exchanges, the geographic markets are different.

Andre P. Barlow
Few missions are as important to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division as preventing anti-competitive mergers or permitting them with adequate conditions to prevent competitive harm. After all, a merger is forever — fixing it after the fact is too messy.

The DOJ is currently investigating Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV’s (“ABI”) acquisition of SABMiller PLC, the largest beer merger in history, as well as its proposed divestiture of SABMiller’s interest in the MillerCoors LLC Joint Venture to Molson Coors Brewing Company. These proposed transactions lock in place the two largest beer competitors in the United States while fundamentally changing the dynamics in the beer industry for smaller brewers, distributors, wholesalers and retailers. While ABI maintains that the proposed transactions do not change the competitive landscape, the DOJ knows better.

Indeed, the DOJ’s recent approach in approving Charter Communications Inc.’s acquisition of Time Warner Cable Inc. (“TWC”) and its related acquisition of Bright House Networks LLC to create New Charter, the merged firm, is instructive. Despite no geographic overlap in any local market, the DOJ required comprehensive behavioral conditions to prevent New Charter from engaging in future anti-competitive conduct against its smaller rivals. The DOJ should take the same tough and sophisticated approach to protecting consumers from the much larger ABI/SABMiller merger and the new ownership by Molson Coors, which will create two beer giants that will dwarf its rivals.