Antitrust Lawyer Blog Commentary on Current Developments

Articles Tagged with FTC

On April 27, 2018, the FTC announced that Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC (“Amneal”) may complete its acquisition of an equity share in Impax Laboratories Inc. (“Impax”) so long as Impax divests its rights and assets for ten products to three separate companies.

The FTC concluded that the proposed acquisition would have reduced competition in three markets where both Amneal and Impax competed: (1) generic desipramine hydrochloride tablets; (2) generic ezetimibe and simvastatin immediate release (“IR”) tablets; and (3) generic felbamate tablets.

The FTC also concluded that the proposed acquisition would reduce future competition in seven markets where Amneal or Impax is a current competitor and the other would have been likely to enter the market absent the acquisition: (1) generic aspirin and dipyridamole extended release (“ER”) capsules; (2) generic azelastine nasal spray; (3) generic diclofenac sodium and misoprostol delayed release (“DR”) tablets; (4) generic erythromycin tablets; (5) generic fluocinonide-E cream; (6) generic methylphenidate hydrochloride ER tablets; and (7) generic olopatadine hydrochloride nasal spray.

On March 19, 2018, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed an administrative complaint to block CDK Global’s ( “CDK”) proposed acquisition of Auto/Mate.  The FTC alleged that the deal would violate Sections 5 of the FTC Act and 7 of the Clayton Act.  The parties to the deal abandoned the deal after being faced with a lawsuit.

Background

CDK and Auto/Mate supply dealer management systems (“DMS”) software to franchise new car dealerships. Car dealerships use DMS software, a mission-critical business software to manage nearly every aspect of their business including payroll, accounting, financing and inventory.  They track their services, prices, and other crucial functionalities.  The top two DMS software providers, CDK, which had 41% and Reynolds & Reynolds (“Reynolds”), which had 29%, combined for about a 70% share of the DMS software market. The big two are the highest priced, and have similar business models, which include long-term contracts and significant initial and monthly fees for third-party applications (app) vendors to integrate with their respective DMS. Dealertrack, Autosoft and Auto/Mate also had competitive DMS offerings as well as others. Auto/Mate was a very small competitor with only 6% of the market.  After the deal, CDK’s market share would have been 47%.

On March 7, 2018, the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) announced it entered into a settlement agreement with Air Medical Group allowing it to acquire AMR for $2.4 billion.

The two providers of ambulance services agreed to divest inter-facility air ambulance transport services in Hawaii to resolve FTC concerns that their proposed merger would likely harm competition among air ambulance transport services that transfer patients between medical facilities on different Hawaiian islands.

According to the FTC’s complaint, Air Medical Group and AMR Holdco are the only two providers of air ambulance services in Hawaii that transport patients between medical facilities on different islands.  Patients depend on these services when they need medical or surgical care that is not available in their local communities, according to the complaint.  Without a remedy, the acquisition is likely to lessen competition and will tend to create a monopoly in the market for inter-facility air ambulance services in Hawaii, in violation of U.S. antitrust laws.  The merger as proposed would also increase the likelihood that consumers, third-party payers, or government health care providers would be forced to pay higher prices or experience a degradation in service or quality, according to the complaint.  The FTC alleges that new entry into the market for inter-facility air ambulance transport services, or expansion by existing firms in adjacent businesses would not be likely, timely, and sufficient to restore the lost competition without a remedy.

On March 5, 2018, the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed an administrative complaint alleging that J.M. Smucker Co.’s (“Smucker”) proposed $285 million acquisition of Conagra Brands, Inc.’s (“Conagra”) Wesson cooking oil brand may substantially lessen competition and reduce competition for canola and vegetable oils in the United States.

Smucker currently owns the Crisco brand, and by acquiring the Wesson brand, it would control at least 70% of the market for branded canola and vegetable oils sold to grocery stores and other retailers.  Smucker and Conagra both manufacture and sell a wide range of food products, including canola and vegetable oil, other types of oils, and shortening.  The FTC also claims that other branded canola and vegetable oils available in the United States, such as Mazola and LouAna, each control only a small share of the market, and do not hold the same brand equity.  Furthermore, building sufficient brand equity to expand would require substantial investment and take at least several years.

Under the proposed acquisition, Smucker would obtain all intellectual property rights to the Wesson brand, as well as inventory and manufacturing equipment.

On March 1, 2018, Essilor International S.A. (“Essilor”) and Luxottica Group S.p.A. (“Luxottica”) announced that the proposed combination between the two companies has been cleared by both the FTC and the EC without conditions.

Critics raised concerns about the merged company’s shutting out competitors, which would leave consumers with fewer options and less freedom of choice.  For example, if the merged firm bundles together frames and lenses for sale in its Lenscrafters stores, other lens manufacturers will lose sales.  Independent stores might also be left out or excluded from the markets.  The concern was not just in these critics’ imagination as Luxottica has a history of shutting out its rivals.  Year ago, Luxottica and Oakley had a disagreement about pricing, and Luxottica stopped Oakley’s products in their stores. Oakley’s stock price collapsed, and it was later bought by Luxottica. Critics also claimed the merger eliminated competition between the two companies and ends the possibility of future competition. Essilor had started promoting its own sunglasses and online sales, and Luxottica was beginning its own lens manufacturing.  The two firms were expanding into each other’s markets and competing against each others, which would have driven down prices, improved quality, and helped consumers.  Given the decisions by the FTC and EC, that competition will never occur.

According to the FTC in its statement to close its investigation of the merger, the evidence did not support a conclusion that Essilor’s proposed acquisition of Luxottica violates federal antitrust laws: “FTC staff extensively investigated every plausible theory and used aggressive assumptions to assess the likelihood of competitive harm.  The investigation exhaustively examined information provided by a wide and deep swath of market participants, as well as the parties’ own documents and data.  Assessing the likely competitive effects of a proposed transaction is a fact-specific exercise that takes into account the current market dynamics, which may be different in the future.  Here, however, the evidence did not support a conclusion that Essilor’s proposed acquisition of Luxottica may be substantially to lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.”  The FTC vote to close the investigation and issue the closing statement was 2-0.

On February 2, 2018, Bruce Hoffman, the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) acting Director of the Bureau of Competition, announced at the Global Competition Review Seventh Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum that the FTC will no longer accept divestitures of inhalant and injectable pipeline drugs in pharmaceutical mergers.  Historically, the FTC had accepted divestiture of pipeline asset to remedy potential competition concerns.  Hoffman said that the FTC is making changes to how it resolves anticompetitive pharmaceutical mergers because past divestitures of assets in the research and development pipeline had a high failure rate for inhalants and injectables, which are known to be difficult and complex to manufacture.

The past history of problems with divestitures in this area indicated to the FTC that divesting ongoing manufacturing assets rather than pipeline assets that have not come to market places greater risk of failure on the merging firms rather than consumers.  Accordingly, in situations in which the parties to the transaction own both an established inhalant or injectable that is currently being manufactured and an overlapping pipeline inhalant or injectable, the FTC will seek a divestiture of the manufactured product that is already on the market.  The FTC, for example, may require the divestiture of contract manufacturing capabilities rather than other assets, such as research and development assets.

The FTC is taking the stance because of an internal study that revealed that the rate of failure for divestitures of complex pipeline products was “startlingly high”.  Apparently, divestiture buyers have had difficulty in actually getting the complex pipeline assets to market. Not surprisingly, a divestiture buyer could struggle to reliably manufacture a complex pharmaceutical product, which harms its ability to ultimately bring the product to market.  Indeed, all kinds of things can go wrong when trying to launch a complex pharmaceutical product.  For instance, the divestiture buyer of pipeline assets could have difficulty obtaining final FDA approvals including the OK to actually manufacture the product.

Historically, the FTC and DOJ have sought to unwind consummated mergers that are deemed to be anticompetitive.  During Trump’s first year in office, the FTC and DOJ have demonstrated their willingness to unwind anticompetitive mergers that somehow sneaked by the regulators.

FTC Seeks to Unwind Merger of Prosthetic Knee Manufacturers

On December 20, 2017, the FTC filed an administrative complaint to unwind the merger of Otto Bock HealthCare North America, Inc., (“Otto Bock”) and FIH Group Holdings, LLC (“Freedom”), two manufacturers of prosthetic knees equipped with microprocessors that adapt the joint to surface conditions and walking rhythm.  In September 2017, the parties simultaneously signed a merger agreement and consummated the merger without the FTC having an opportunity to review the deal.  Apparently, the merger was not HSR reportable.  According to the FTC, the merger eliminated direct and substantial competition between head to head competitors that engaged in intense price and innovation competition.  While the litigation is ongoing, the parties agreed to a Hold Separate and Asset Maintenance Agreement, which prevents them from continuing the integration of the two businesses.  The FTC did not allege any violation of the HSR ACT.

On December 15, 2017, a federal district court granted the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) and North Dakota Attorney General’s request for a preliminary injunction against Sanford Health’s proposed acquisition of Mid Dakota Clinic, a large multispecialty group, pending the FTC’s administrative trial on the merits scheduled for January of 2018.  FTC v. Sanford Health, et al., Case. No. 1:17-cv-00133 (D. N.D. Dec. 15, 2017).

Background

In June of 2017, the FTC and the North Dakota Attorney General sued to block the merger of the two largest physician groups in Bismarck and Mandan, North Dakota.  The FTC alleged that the two groups had based on physician headcount at 75 percent of the physicians for adult primary care physician services, pediatric services, and obstetrics and gynecology services, and 100 percent of the general surgery physician services in the Bismarck-Mandan area.  The merger would eliminate competition between them and substantially lessen competition in the four markets.

On December 14, 2017, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voted 3-2 to adopt the Restoring Internet Freedom Order and in doing so, scrapped its net neutrality rules that were put in place in 2015.

Net Neutrality is a principle that allows for an open and free internet.  The Internet Service Providers (ISPs”) are the gatekeepers to all content on the internet.  Net Neutrality rules prohibited ISPs from unfairly discriminating against others by speeding up, slowing down, throttling, or blocking the delivery of internet traffic.  Net Neutrality is what gives users the freedom as they browse through web pages, apps or any other content available on the internet.

By scrapping the FCC’s Net Neutrality rules, ISPs will be free to act without burdensome regulations, which imposed substantial costs, chilled investment, and lessened innovation. ISPs, however, will be required to disclose information about their practice to consumers, entreprenuers, and the Commission, including any blocking, throttling, paid prioritization, or affiliated prioritization.  While the FCC is returning to a light touch approach, its action restores the FTC’s jurisdiction to act when ISPs or broadband providers get out of line through unfair, deceptive, or anticompetitive acts.

On December 6, 2017, Senator Elizabeth Warren sharply criticized the state of antitrust enforcement in a speech at the Open Markets Institute.

She said that antitrust enforcers adopted the Chicago School principles, which narrowed the scope of the antitrust laws and allowed mega-mergers to proceed resulting in many concentrated industries.  She believes that antitrust enforcers already have the tools to reduce concentrated markets and that they simply must start enforcing the law again.

Senator Warren’s recommendations included stronger merger enforcement, cracking down on anticompetitive conduct and increasing agency involvement in defending competition.